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The Challenges of Regulating Warez Trading
ERIC GOLDMAN
Marquette University Law School
This article analyzes the policy challenges of legally conforming the behavior of warez traders. The
article discusses the motivations for warez trading, how criminalizing the behavior may counterpro-
ductively encourage it, and why legislators and prosecutors continue to target warez trading despite the
counterproductive effects.
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This article discusses a group of copyright infringers known as warez traders. Warez(pronounced the same as wares) are copies of infringed copyrighted works (particu-
larly commercial software) with any copy protection mechanisms removed. Warez traders
obtain and disseminate warez as an avocation, some spending 60 or more hours per week on
this hobby (McCandless, 1997).
As a sociological group, warez traders owe their existence to computer-mediated com-
munication. Electronic networks such as the Internet create the opportunity for traders to
find and communicate with each other and to trade infringing files at virtually no cost. This
article discusses their unique sociological and psychological attributes and the resulting
challenges for conforming warez traders’ behavior to legal norms.
SUBCATEGORIES OF WAREZ TRADERS
The generic term warez trading imprecisely lumps together disparate activities. In fact,
several subcommunities comprise the warez scene. Warez distributors are fairly large and
organized operations optimized to generate high volumes of new warez quickly. These oper-
ations allocate among their members several discrete tasks including sourcing new warez,
cracking any technological protection devices, testing the cracked warez to make sure they
still work, packaging the warez for easy distribution, couriering the warez from site to site,
performing systems administration, and managing and overseeing the operations. Warez
collectors collect and trade warez more autonomously. They may be trying to gain admission
to a warez distribution group, or they may be enthusiasts who just like to show off trophies
(Granade, 2003a; McCandless, 1997).
Warez distributors and collectors do not care about the functional capabilities of the
warez they trade; they only care about how others will evaluate the possession or distribution
of the warez. As a result, these traders rarely use the warez they possess (McCandless, 1997;
Pogue, 1997; Tetzlaff, 2000, p. 109). In contrast, warez downloaders are not traders per se;
instead, they obtain warez they want to use. Many warez downloaders just want free software
or the latest cutting-edge items (Granade, 2003a; Poole, 2003).
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Finally, abandonware enthusiasts collect and distribute software (especially gaming soft-
ware) that is no longer published commercially (Granade, 2003b; Saltzman, 2003). Some
abandonware traders characterize themselves as archivists or historians, preserving games
that would otherwise be lost. Others are just enthusiasts (Costikyan, 2000; Granade, 2003b;
Saltzman, 2003). Many abandonware enthusiasts consider their activities less detrimental to
copyright owners than is warez trading (because, by definition, the copyright owners have
stopped commercializing the work), and on that basis they seek to distance themselves from
warez traders (Granade, 2003b).
WHAT MOTIVATES WAREZ TRADERS?
To determine how warez trading can be conformed to legal norms, it is essential to under-
stand their psychology and motivation.
Ego
Fundamentally, almost all warez traders are motivated by ego. For warez distributors,
“The whole point . . . is to get the pirate program released and distributed before any other
group” (Farnon, 2003). A distributor’s reputation is built by releasing warez fast, ideally
before anyone else. The crowning achievement is a 0-day release, a release made before the
official commercial release (McCandless, 1997). Fast and error-free distribution of hard-to-
obtain or hard-to-crack software evidences the trader’s skills (McCandless, 1997, 2001). In
this sense, warez distribution and collection is a game or a competition where the partici-
pants use copyrighted works to seek to win fame and respect by playing better than their
peers.
Thrill of the Illicit
Many warez traders derive a thrill from doing something illicit (Wagner, 2002). Accord-
ing to one warez site operator, “Deep down everyone is a little scared [of criminal prosecu-
tion] but that is also what keeps us going” (Wagner, 2002).
Software Should Be Free
Almost all warez traders believe software should be free, and they view themselves
as technology liberators and benefactors for the oppressed, like an Internet Robin Hood
(Miller, 2000). Specifically, many warez traders view the software industry as the enemy due
to industry tactics perceived to be oppressive (Granade, 2003a, 2003b; McCandless, 1997).
With their software should be free philosophy, many warez traders bitterly oppose com-
mercial pirates who infringe copyrighted works for profit because, like software manufac-
turers, commercial pirates commit the sin of charging consumers for what should be free
(McCandless, 1997; Tetzlaff, 2000).
Historically, warez traders believed that to download warez you must return something
(such as uploading software in return) (Tetzlaff, 2000). However, as the community’s self-
perception as Robin Hoods matures, many warez traders now routinely distribute warez
freely without any expectations of receiving something in return (Granade, 2003b).
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Sense of Community
The warez scene is a community, and many participants form tight friendships. Many
warez traders are social misfits in the physical world, but online they find kindred spirits. As
one warez trader said, “[Warez traders] want to belong. They have been shunned by every-
one, and thus turn to cyberspace for acceptance” (Farnon, 2003).
A COMPARISON OF WAREZ TRADERS
AND HACKERS OR CRACKERS
Warez traders share many common attributes with hackers and crackers. Most obviously,
every major warez distribution group has at least one cracker who disables any copy protec-
tion technologies in the warez. In addition, both groups tend to be overwhelmingly male,
although the stereotypical hacker or cracker is a teenage boy (Thomas, 2002, p. xiv), whereas
many warez traders are older, married, and working in professional information technology
jobs (Goldman, 2003, p. 395). In addition, hackers or crackers and warez traders both crave
attention, although hackers or crackers may care more about proving their smarts and about
emancipation from their parents (Thomas, 2002, p. xvi) than about just boosting their ego.
Finally, both hackers or crackers and warez traders share the information wants to be free
ethos and negatively react to fences around digital properties (Jordan & Taylor, 1998,
p. 760).
A COMPARISON OF WAREZ TRADERS
AND PEER-TO-PEER FILE TRADERS
Warez distributors and collectors regularly trade music and movie files in addition to soft-
ware, although to be attractive traded music and movies must be rare. A file that anyone can
obtain from a peer-to-peer network is not interesting to these warez traders, whereas a
prerelease copy of a movie or song can be a juicy trophy. As a result, warez traders have little
in common with the vast majority of peer-to-peer file traders who want movies and music for
personal enjoyment not for trophies. Peer-to-peer file traders most closely resemble warez
downloaders, the principal difference being that warez downloaders may be more intrepid
and willing to risk downloading software with harmful viruses or lacking technical support
or documentation (risks inapplicable to content files such as music or movies). Because
peer-to-peer file traders have different motivations than do most warez traders, peer-to-peer
file traders may be comparatively more responsive to legal regulation.
THE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE NATURE OF
CRIMINALIZING WAREZ TRADING
Criminal copyright law assumes that criminals are rational actors who will curtail behav-
ior in response to threatened punishment. However, warez traders may not be motivated by
this threat system. Although warez traders have codes of ethics, they are indifferent to exter-
nally imposed rules in which they do not believe. Instead, criminal threats stroke warez trad-
ers’ egos by making their actions appear more impressive (Tetzlaff, 2000, p. 115).
Criminalizing warez trading may also reinforce the warez traders’ self-perception as do-
gooders fighting unjust laws. As copyright laws become more stringent, warez traders’ self-
perceived moral justification for their actions may increase accordingly.
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Criminal sanctions also deepen warez traders’ social bonds to each other. In an us versus
them world (where them refers to software companies, the government, or any form of
authority), warez traders already perceive themselves as outcasts. Criminalization further
reinforces their status as outlaws having more in common with each other than with the rest
of society. Once socialized into this community, warez traders have trouble leaving it
because it becomes the only place where they feel that they belong.
CONCLUSION
During its consideration of the No Electronic Theft Act (the most recent major amend-
ment to U.S. criminal copyright laws), Congress targeted warez traders as the cause of ram-
pant Internet piracy. In truth, warez traders probably have a falsely exaggerated effect on
piracy. However, warez traders make good legislative targets because of their quasiguerrilla
tactics: they operate stealthily, behind the Internet’s opaque veil, and are impossible to spot
offline. In addition, when online, warez traders exude cockiness and invincibility that legis-
lators may interpret as a challenge to their power and authority.
However, no quantum of stiffened criminal penalties will eradicate warez trading. Warez
trading is about ego, prestige, and reputation, and so long as intangible assets are fenced off,
a group of enthusiasts will seek recognition for breaching the fences. Increased criminal pen-
alties may counterproductively make warez trading more attractive.
Despite this obvious policy deficiency, legislators continue to seek tougher and more per-
vasive criminal infringement laws. Copyright owner lobbyists have convinced legislators
that Internet piracy is cataclysmic. But with Internet piracy increasing, rather than decreas-
ing, legislators feel that they have failed to find a legislative solution that gets infringers to
respect the criminal copyright laws that industry lobbyists have persuaded them are so
desperately needed.
These dynamics put prosecutors in a bind. On the one hand, to respond to Congress’ frus-
tration, prosecutors feel they need to deliver high-profile criminal copyright convictions. On
the other hand, if prosecutors pursue behavior that average citizens commit every day, they
will create mass panic and will undercut popular support for their mission.
By targeting warez traders, prosecutors walk this fine line. Congress thinks warez traders
contribute significantly to piracy, so busts of warez traders satisfy Congress. Most citizens
can distinguish a warez trader’s behavior from their own. As a result, prosecutors will likely
continue to prioritize warez trader prosecutions despite the policy deficiencies of doing so.
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